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The Dynamics of Common Law Evolution 
Douglas BRODIE* 
In Commonwealth Bank of Australia v. Barker [2014] HCA 32 (Barker) the 
High Court of Australia held that the implied term of mutual trust and 
confidence was not part of the law of the employment contract in Australia. 
This article considers the impact that the decision will have on the position 
of employees at common law and on the way that the law is likely to 
develop. It suggests that the impact of Barker may be marginalised 
marginalized by the ever increasing importance of good faith in the law of 
contract and that in assessing the extent to which the common law affords 
protection for the interests of employees it is imperative to take account of 
the obligations imposed by the law of tort. Finally, the article explores the 
dynamics of common law evolution more generally through the prism of 
Barker. It is suggested that two key factors in determining the manner in 
which the law develops are the values espoused by the common law and the 
extent to which statute is allowed to act as a constraint rather than treated 
as a catalyst. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Historically the common law has not been regarded as the friend of the 
worker. Where collective relations are concerned, developments in the law 
of the economic torts have been seen as inimical to the interests of labour.1 
At the level of the individual relationship, the adoption of the obligations of 
the law of master and servant by the employment contract through the 
medium of implied terms has been the subject of trenchant criticism.2 
                                                          
* Professor and Executive Dean, Faculty of Humanities & Social Sciences, University of 
Strathclyde, Glasgow, UK douglas.brodie@strath.ac.uk. 
1 Rookes v. Barnard [1964] AC 1129 being but one example. 
2 A. Bogg, Good Faith in the Contract of Employment: A Case of the English Reserve, 32 
&RPS/DE/	3RO¶\--±2011). 
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However, over the last thirty years or so, the courts have adopted a 
somewhat different and markedly more enlightened approach to the law of 
the employment contract. The judiciary now recognise recognize that a 
worker¶'s interest in the employment relationship is more than a purely 
financial one: 
 
µemployment often plays a central part in determining whether individuals 
are able to achieve many of their aspirations. Equally important for many 
people, a job is closely linked to feelings of self-worth and dignity.¶3 
 
 They have also become cognisant of the existence and significance of the 
stark imbalance of power that is the hallmark of that relationship: µHistory 
tells us that in the absence of any organisation organization there is too great 
a risk of inequality of bargaining power, of exploitation of workers, and of 
damage to the social fabric.¶4 The Canadian courts have been particularly 
eloquent and persistent in depicting a contemporary vision of employment 
relations that is more accommodating to the position of the employee. Of 
late, for example, in Potter v. New Brunswick the Supreme Court of Canada 
referred to their earlier decision in Reference re Public Service Employee 
Relations Act5 and reaffirmed their view that work is now considered to be 
µRQHRIWKHPRVWIXQGDPHQWDODVSHFWVLQDSHUVRQ¶VOLIHSURYLGLQJWKH
individual with a means of financial support and, as importantly, a 
contributory role in society¶.¶6 The values embodied in the latter dictum 
have been influential in the development of the common law in a variety of 
jurisdictions including Australia and the UK.7 The recognition of the non-
pecuniary benefits of employment was significant in Potter itself and it was 
held that, at common law, where the employer is not under a general 
                                                          
3 Sir Ivor Richardson, µ`The Role of the Courts in Industrial Relations,¶ 12 NZJLR 113 
(1987). 
4 Ibid. 
5 Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313, 368. 
6 Potter v. New Brunswick [2015] 1 SCR 500. 
7 The impact of such high-level statements in Canada itself is discussed by C. Mumme in 
this issue. 
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obligation to provide work, the employer may not withhold work in bad 
faith or without justification. $Q\GHFLVLRQWRWKHFRQWUDU\µwould 
undermine the non-monetary benefit all workers may in fact derive from the 
performance of their work¶.¶ 
One of the most significant instances of a refashioned common law 
regime has been the emergence of the implied obligation of mutual trust and 
confidence in the UK.8 For a number of years the Australian courts appeared 
to be edging towards adoption of the term but in 2014, in Commonwealth 
Bank of Australia v. Barker (Barker), the High Court held, utterly 
unequivocally, that it was not part of the law of the employment contract in 
Australia.9 By way of contrast, in the UK the Supreme Court has been 
consistent in its endorsement of mutual trust and any reversal of this 
position would greatly diminish the protection afforded by the common law. 
In particular in Eastwood v. Magnox the House of Lords (as was) made 
clear that the Johnson v. Unisys exception should not be seen as an 
impediment to the natural evolution of mutual trust in situations other than 
dismissal.10 Were the position in the UK to change, the wider ramifications 
would be weighty, since there would be an impact on statutory rights as it 
would be more difficult to demonstrate that constructive dismissal had taken 
place. It is also important to appreciate that the emergence of mutual trust 
was an exemplar of a changed judicial view of the employment relationship 
in the UK and any reversal might be seen as heralding, or even encouraging, 
a return to traditional values. 
                                                          
8 Malik v. BCCI [1998] AC 20. 
9 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v. Barker [2014] HCA 32. Swindells v. State of Victoria 
[2015] VSC 19 raised the question whether mutual trust or good faith might be implied as a 
term in fact on a case-by-case basis. which would ameliorate to some extent the impact of 
Barker. However, in State of New South Wales v. Shaw [2015] NSWCA 97, it was held that 
the fact that employment was probationary does not provide a meaningful point of 
distinction. 
10 Eastwood v. Magnox [2005] 1 AC 503; Johnson v. Unisys [2003] 1 AC 518. And see D. 
Brodie, Protecting Dignity in the Workplace: The Vitality of Mutual Trust and Confidence, 
33 ILJ 349 (2004). 
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A key question for Australia is whether Barker represents a rejection of 
the more progressive approach that has come to the fore in recent years or 
whether it can be viewed more narrowly. There is certainly cause for 
concern. Jessup J, who was in the minority in the court below but vindicated 
by the High Court, remarking that he would: 
 
 µnot regard a distinction between the master-servant relationship and the 
employer-employee relationship as particularly illuminating, or as helpful in 
explaining the doctrinal justification for the emergence of the implied term. 
In this country, these two identifiers have for years been recognised as 
referring to one and the same thing.¶11 
 
 Moreover, he thought that considerations VXFKDVµthe provision of job 
satisfaction, a sense of identity, self-worth, emotional well-being and 
GLJQLW\¶VKRXOGQRWLQIRUPWKHFRQWHQWRIWKHHPSOR\PHQWFRQWUDFW The 
High Court were also anxious to dissociate themselves from being party to a 
µWUDQVIRUPDWLYHDSSURDFK¶WRWKHODZRIWKe employment contract. 
This article seeks to assess the impact of Barker. It does so, in part, by 
trying to gauge the extent to which the outcome in individual cases will be 
different given that the common law may afford an alternate basis of claim. 
It also analyses the significance of the decision from a doctrinal perspective. 
The article goes on to suggest that the impact of Barker may be 
marginalized by the ever increasing importance of good faith in the law of 
contract and that in assessing the extent to which the common law affords 
protection for the interests of employees, it is imperative to take account of 
the obligations imposed by the law of tort. Finally, the article explores the 
dynamics of common law evolution more generally through the prism of 
Barker. It is suggested that two key factors in determining the manner in 
which the law develops are the values espoused by the common law and the 
extent to which statute is allowed to act as a constraint rather than treated as 
a catalyst. 
                                                          
11 Commonwealth Bank of Australia v. Barker [2013] FCAFC 83, para. 227. 
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2 EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF BARKER 
Given the significance that mutual trust has assumed in the UK, it would be 
easy to conclude that Barker is a decision of great magnitude. This may be 
fallacious, and one way to assess the impact of the decision is to focus on 
the range of workplace situations where employees are now denied a right 
against the employer. I would hazard WKDWWKHHPSOR\HH¶VSRVLWLRQZill in 
fact be diminished to a limited extent. Joellen Riley has highlighted that a 
breach of the term: 
 
µmay be evidenced by various kinds of conduct, depending on the 
circumstances of the employment. The following are examples of the kind 
of conduct which may be found to destroy trust and confidence: 
unwarranted carping criticism; demotion; capricious withdrawal of 
employment benefits; pointed disregard of policy-based entitlements; 
precipitate or unreasonable discipline without prudent and careful 
investigation of complaints.¶12 
 
As is clear from this passage the open-textured nature of the term 
addresses a wide range of situations that are likely to crop up in the 
workplace and, for this very reason, can be immensely valuable to the 
employee. Nevertheless, I would suggest that claimants will, in a significant 
number of cases, be able to look to other forms of common law claim to 
secure protection. Moreover, it will be argued that further grounds of claim 
will continue to emerge. It is also important to remember that in the UK 
mutual trust can be viewed as a synthesis of a number of related 
developments. As a corollary some of the protection afforded would have 
continued to exist had the term not emerged. It is helpful to view the denial 
in Barker in this light and one should also contemplate the possibility of a 
synthesis emerging on a different basis in other jurisdictions. Good faith 
may be one such µorganizLQJ¶SULQFLSOH 
                                                          
12 J. Riley, Siblings but Not Twins: Making Sense of µ`0XWXDO7UXVW¶DQGµ`*RRG)DLWK¶LQ
Employment Contracts, 36 Melbourne U.niversity L.aw Rev.iew 521 (2012). 
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Without seeking to be exhaustive two instances will be explored where a 
claim that might fall under the rubric of mutual trust may be brought on 
another baVLV,QSDUWLFXODU,ZLOOH[SORUHWKHHPSOR\HU¶VREOLJDWLRQVLQ
respect of procedural fairness and the exercise of discretionary powers. 
3 NATURAL JUSTICE 
The obligation of mutual trust and confidence can be seen as µan application 
of natural justice to contemporary industrial relations¶.13 The impact of 
Barker is diminished to the extent that those principles are embodied more 
generally in the common law. Australian administrative law provides that 
whenever a statute gives a public official the power to do something 
DIIHFWLQJDSHUVRQ¶VULJKWVRULQWHUHVWVWKHUXOHVRIQDWXUDOMXVWLFHUHJXODWH
the exercise of that power unless they are excluded by plain words of 
legislative intention. Jarratt v. Commissioner of Police is an application in 
the employment context of this general approach.14 There the Deputy 
Commissioner of Police was dismissed without a hearing and the court had 
to decide whether there was a legal requirement on the part of the 
Commissioner to afford an opportunity to be heard before a 
recommendation went to the Governor-in-Council. This involved construing 
the legislation to determine whether the exercise of the power of removal 
was conditional upon the observance of natural justice and it was observed 
that where µParliament confers a statutory power to destroy, defeat or 
prejudice DSHUVRQ¶V rights, interests or legitimate expectations, Parliament 
is taken to intend that the power be exercised fairly and in accordance with 
QDWXUDOMXVWLFHXQOHVVLWPDNHVWKHFRQWUDU\LQWHQWLRQSODLQ¶Jarratt held that 
there was nothing in the statutory language to displace that intention. The 
approach in Jarratt dictates that a number of public sector employees will 
                                                          
13 Auckland Shop Employees Union v. Woolworths (NZ) Ltd [1985] 2 NZLR 372 and see D. 
Brodie, Mutual Trust and the Values of the Employment Contract, 30 ILJ 84 (2001). 
14 (2005) 224 CLR 44. 
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EHQHILWIURPWKHFRPPRQODZ¶VLQVLVWHQFHRQSURFHGXUDOIDLUQHVVDQ
element of mutual trust is thereby provided by another route.15 It is 
important to note that Jarratt placed far greater emphasis on procedural 
fairness than previous cases and can be seen as contributing to the 
emergence of contemporary judicial values in the employment context.16 
What of employees in the private sector? Traditionally, a few exceptional 
categories apart, natural justice did not play a part in the life of the 
employment contract. In Ridge v. Baldwin Lord Reid said that µthe question 
in a pure case of master and servant does not at all depend on whether the 
master has heard the servant in his own defence: it depends on whether the 
IDFWVHPHUJLQJDWWKHWULDOSURYHEUHDFKRIFRQWUDFW¶ and that position 
continued to hold sway for quite some time.17 In Canada and the UK the 
position has evolved considerably since then, and one can now claim that 
natural justice is one of the core values of the employment contract. There 
are µfew, if any, relationships of employment, public or private, to which the 
requirements of fairness have no application whatever. Very clear statutory 
or contractual language would be necessary to exclude this elementary 
duty¶.¶18 In Canada Potter dealt with suspension and demonstrates that a 
general concept of good faith (rather than the employment-orientated 
obligation of mutual trust) may require that an employee be given reasons 
for a decision to suspend.19 It is striking that the common law has developed 
to the extent that it now imposes requirements not dissimilar to those 
required by the statutory law of unfair dismissal in the UK.20 Such 
                                                          
15 Swindells, n. 9 above. 
16 See G. Carabetta, Going, Going « Gone? The Demise of the Dismissal at Pleasure 
Doctrine in Public Sector Employment, 19 AJLL 283 (2006). 
17 [1964] AC 40. 
18 Marlborough Harbour Board v. Goulden[1996] 1 NZLR 484, 492. 
19 Potter, n. 6 above. 
20 In, Reininger v. Unique Personnel Canada Inc. (2002), 21 C.C.E.L. (3d) 278 (Ont. 
S.C.J.), it was said that: µ`1) The onus is on the employer to demonstrate to the court on a 
FLYLOVWDQGDUGRISURRIWKDWDUHDVRQDEO\VHULRXVDQGLPPHGLDWHULVNWRWKHHPSOR\HU¶V
legitimate interests exists. The employer must establish that the nature of the charge is such 
DVWREHSRWHQWLDOO\KDUPIXOWRWKHHPSOR\HU¶VUHSXWDWLRQRUSURGXFWRUWKDWLWZLOOUHQGHU
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developments take strength from their consistency with general contractual 
principles. The landmark Canadian Supreme Court decision in Bhasin v. 
Hrynew has placed good faith at the very centre of Canadian contract law.21 
At µa minimum, acting in good faith in relation to contractual dealings 
PHDQVEHLQJKRQHVWUHDVRQDEOHFDQGLGDQGIRUWKULJKW¶and Potter is a good 
example in the employment context. 
In the UK Gogay v. Hertfordshire CC held that the punitive exercise of 
prerogative powers may be a breach of mutual trust in the absence of due 
process: the employer would not have lost in that case had they taken the 
trouble to establish that there was reasonable cause to suspend.22 Stevens v. 
University of Birmingham is a recent application of Gogay where the failure 
to allow the employee to be accompanied to an investigation constituted a 
breach of contract.23 Stevens reminds us that mutual trust is sensitive to the 
vulnerabilities of employees (particularly where there is a threat to the 
existence of the relationship): 
 
µThe person best placed to provide the evidence in support of the 
employee¶'s case is usually the employee himself, but he may not always 
appreciate the significance of a particular piece of information. A union 
representative is likely to be experienced in safeguarding the interests of 
members in these circumstances, and should be able to help the employee to 
identify the significant features, and ensure that they are mentioned.¶24 
 
It may be claimed that: 
                                                                                                                                                   
the employee unable properly to perform his duties, or that it will have a harmful effect on 
its employees or customers. 2) The employer must show that it made a genuine attempt to 
assess the risk of continuing employment, including making its own investigation or 
LQTXLU\«7KHHPSOR\HUPXVWDOVRVKRZWKDWLWKDVWDNHQUHDVRQDEOHVWHSVWRDVFHUWDLQ
whether the risk of continued employment might be mitigated through such techniques as 
closer supervision or transfer to another position. 4) There is a continuing onus on the 
employer during a period of suspension to consider objectively the possibility of 
reinstatement within a reasonable period of time following suspension in light of new facts 
RUFLUFXPVWDQFHVWKDWPD\FRPHWRLWVDWWHQWLRQ¶  
21 [2014] 3 SCR 495. 
22 [2000] IRLR 703. 
23 [2015] EWHC 2300. 
24 Ibid. at para 95. 
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µa golden thread through the case law on fair treatment is that those liable to 
be affected by a decision must be given prior notice of it so that they can 
make representations. A corollary is that any representations must be taken 
into account by the decision-maker. The greater detriment a decision is 
likely to cause the more demanding these duties¶.25 
 
,WPXVWEHVDLGWKDW/RUG5HLG¶VGLFWXPin Ridge appears to have had 
greater longevity in Australia: 
 
 µin deciding what conduct of an employer will damage or destroy mutual 
trust and confidence, the employee cannot complain that he or she was 
denied natural justice. To hold otherwise would be to create a duty to afford 
natural justice in all contracts of employment, thus creating by the back door 
a duty which the common law has consistently held to be absent from the 
relationship between employer and employee.¶26 
 
 The position is though far from being without hope and, prior to Barker, 
the Supreme Court of New South Wales had been prepared to assume in 
Russell v. Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church that a defect in process 
might constitute a breach of mutual trust.27 However, µthe respondents did 
not demonstrate any element of bad faith, or act in such a way as to 
seriously damage mutual trust and confidence, in conducting a telephone 
interview of a principal witness rather than a face-to-face interview¶.¶ A key 
question to pose is whether it would now be futile for an Australian claimant 
to argue that some form of a right to a hearing should be implied before a 
detriment could be imposed. I do not believe this to be the case. Such an 
implication would have to satisfy the necessity test, but it may be argued 
that it is essential to proper decision-making that the employer is fully 
                                                          
25 Yapp v. FCO [2013] IRLR 616. On appeal (Yapp v. FCO [2015] ICR D13) the 
commitment to procedural fairness was diluted as it was found that whilst the process 
DGRSWHGE\WKHHPSOR\HUEUHDFKHGWKHFODLPDQW¶VFRQWUDFWXDOREOLJDWLRQVWKDWZDVRQO\
because it fell out with the range of reasonable responses. Yapp would seem to be 
inconsistent with Bournemouth University v. Buckland [2011] 1 QB 323 which denies that 
the band of reasonableness test has a role to play in determining whether a breach of mutual 
trust and confidence has arisen. 
26 Morton v. Transport Appeal Board (No 1) [2007] NSWSC 1454. 
27 [2008] NSWCA 217. 
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informed; necessity could be said to exist on the basis that action 
GHWULPHQWDOWRWKHSDUWLHV¶UHODWLRQVKLSmight otherwise occur. It is not in the 
HPSOR\HU¶VLQWHUHVWVWRDFWDJDLQVWWKHHPSOR\HHHUURQHRXVO\DQGGDPDJHD
hitherto fruitful relationship. It is worth recalling that Jarratt recognized that 
it is not only employees who stand to benefit from a requirement of 
procedural fairness. Callinan J drew attention to the beneficial effects on 
morale that can occur and, as a result, employers may gain as efficiency in 
the workplace may be enhanced.28 I would also suggest that should an 
implied obligation of good faith be recognized by the general law of 
contract in Australia it would be likely that a right to hearing would be 
viewed as incidental to that obligation.29 It is difficult to see that detrimental 
action in breach of the latter right is compatible with a relationship informed 
by good faith. 
There is a clear tendency across a range of jurisdictions to place greater 
emphasis on procedural fairness. For instance, in the recent New Zealand 
case of Rodkiss v. Carter Holt Harvey, it was said the: 
 
 µproblem with that explanation, however, is that the issues identified were 
all matters that reIOHFWHGDGYHUVHO\RQ0U5RGNLVV¶ performance and, as 
VXFKLQWHUPVRI&++¶s basic obligations of fairness and good faith, they 
should have been discussed with him and he should have had an opportunity 
to comment upon them before Mr Adams made his decision to implement 
the PIP [performance improvement plan].¶30 
 
 Australia has already gone down this road in public law and private law 
may well follow. 
4 CONTROLLING DISCRETION 
                                                          
28 Jarratt, n. 14 above. 
29 Such an implication would not be permissible in the event of conflict with a statutory 
scheme. 
30 [2015] NZEmpC 34. 
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In the UK an intriguing feature of the endorsement of mutual trust and 
confidence by the House of Lords in Malik v. BCCI was that commercial 
law (and indeed contract law as a whole) would not at that point have 
countenanced an obligation of that type.31 Judicial recognition of the 
particular needs of the employment relationship appeared to be leading to 
the formation of a self-contained body of rules which stood apart from the 
general principles of contract law: µThe contract of employment cannot be 
equated with an ordinary commercial contract. It is a special relationship 
under which workers and employers have mutual obligations of confidence, 
trust and fair dealing.¶32 The law of that µsSHFLDOUHODWLRQVKLS¶EHJDQWR
exhibit significant differences. For instance, discretionary powers were 
regulated by the law of the employment contract much more closely: an 
HPSOR\HU¶VGLVFUHWLRQVKRXOGµbe exercised in good faith and not arbitrarily, 
capriciously or irrationally¶.¶33 The position has moved on considerably 
since then, and contract law as a whole appears to be moving to a common 
position on the role of norms of good faith and fair dealing. 34 Mutual trust 
may have acted as a catalyst in this process.35 
In Australia the development of the law of contract has been very 
different and the law of commercial contracts has made considerable 
progress towards an obligation of fair dealing, whilst the rate of progress 
towards recognition of mutual trust and confidence has been unspectacular 
and ultimately that journey proved futile. Developments in a number of 
areas including commercial law have meant that common law controls over 
discretionary powers are increasingly prevalent and indeed are now very 
wide ranging. For instance, in Far Horizons Pty v. 0F'RQDOG¶V$XVWUDOLD 
the court proceeded on the basis that franchise agreements contain an 
                                                          
31 Malik, n. 8 above. 
32 Telecom South v. Post Office Union [1992] ERNZ 116. 
33 Horkulak v. Cantor Fitzgerald International [2005] ICR 402. 
34 See D. Brodie, Fair Dealing and the World of Work, 43 ILJ 29 (2014). 
35 See D. Brodie, in M. Freedland (ed.), The Contract of Employment, (M. Freedland ed., 
OUP: 2016). 
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implied term of good faith and fair dealing which obliges each party to 
exercise the powers conferred upon it by the agreement in good faith and 
reasonably, and not capriciously or for some extraneous purpose.36 It has 
been judicially observed that obligations of this sort now permeate many 
areas of law apart from contract law, including property law, administrative 
law, the law of trusts, and insolvency law.37 It is also the case that certain 
types of contract are seen by some judges as more appropriate vessels for 
obligations of the fair dealing or good faith type: 
 
 µmost of the cases where a result was determined by a finding of both an 
existence and a breach of the implied obligation of good faith were cases 
involving franchise, distribution and licence agreements. Franchise 
relationships, of course, have a well-recognised historical capacity to 
manifest an imbalance of bargaining power between the parties.¶38 
 
 The relationships of franchise and employment are decidedly analogous 
and might be thought to merit a similar approach. Against that backdrop, I 
would suggest that whilst, for the moment, there may not be an overarching 
obligation of good faith in Australian contract law, discretionary powers are 
increasingly likely to be subject to an implied restriction and it seems 
reasonable to assume that such controls will operate in the employment 
context. Cases drawn from commerce show that good faith will often 
achieve very similar outcomes to mutual trust and confidence. In Barker it 
was said that: 
 
 µThe above conclusion should not be taken as reflecting upon the question 
whether there is a general obligation to act in good faith in the performance 
of contracts. Nor does it reflect upon the related question whether 
contractual powers and discretions may be limited by good faith and 
rationality requirements analogous to those applicable in the sphere of 
public law.¶ 
 
                                                          
36 [2000] VSC 310. 
37 Sino Iron Pty v. Mineralogy Pty [2014] WASC 444. 
38 Caratti Holdings v. Coventry Group [2014] WASC 403. 
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 Australian cases since then suggest that, the caution expressed in the 
foregoing dictum notwithstanding, courts will regulate discretionary powers 
in the employment context on the basis of fair dealing. One such instance is 
Romero v. Farstad Shipping where it was said that the HPSOR\HU¶V: 
 
µpower to change its policies, or to introduce new policies, from time to time 
would be constrained by an implied term that it would act with due regard 
IRUWKHSXUSRVHVRIWKHFRQWUDFWRIHPSOR\PHQW«VRLWFRXOGQRWDFW
capricLRXVO\DQGDUJXDEO\FRXOGQRWDFWXQIDLUO\WRZDUGVWKHUHVSRQGHQW«,W
might also be a power which, by implication, must be exercised reasonably 
having regard to the nature of the contract and the entitlements which exist 
under it«¶.39 
 
UGL Rail Services v. Janik and James v. Royal Bank provide further 
examples.40 Despite Barker the approach is in line with that taken in earlier 
cases such as Mallone v. BPB Industries in the UK41 and, in Australia, 
Silverbrook Research Pty Ltd v. Lindley.42 In my view it is almost certain 
that, where this dimension of contract law is concerned, Barker will prove 
to be an irrelevance. 
5 THE IMPOSITION OF DOCTRINAL 
LIMITATIONS 
Two dimensions of Barker may prove troublesome for employees: the view 
taken on the nature of the implied duty of co-operation and the retreat to the 
business efficacy test. It is important to note that, in the UK, whilst mutual 
trust may well be derived from the general duty of co-operation, it is a 
positive version of that obligation and that has been a factor of the first 
                                                          
39 [2014] FCAFC 177. 
40 UGL Rail Services v. Janik [2014] NSWCA 346. In James v. Royal Bank [2015] NSWSC 
243 the employer had discretion over whether to make a redundancy payment but was held 
to be under an obligation to consider the issue in good faith. On the facts a breach arose 
given that the employer had fettered that discretion: µ`the decision was dictated by the 
blanket policy formulated on 7 November 2008 not to make any ex gratia payments on 
DFFRXQWRIERQXVWRGHSDUWLQJHPSOR\HHV¶ 
41 [2002] ICR 1045. 
42 [2010] NSWCA 357. 
Formatted: Not Highlight
Formatted: Not Highlight
Formatted: Font: Not Italic, Not Highlight
Formatted: Not Highlight
Commented [s4]:  ?Y ?WůĞĂƐĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌƌĞƉŚƌĂƐŝŶŐĂƐ ?ƚŽďĞ
ŝƌƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ ? ? Agreed 
Formatted: Superscript, Not Highlight
Formatted: Superscript, Not Highlight
Formatted: Superscript, Not Highlight
Formatted: Superscript, Not Highlight
33 
 
LPSRUWDQFHLQWHUPVRIWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIWKHHPSOR\HU¶VREOLJDWLRQV to 
meet contemporary expectations.43 An expansive version of the obligation 
has resulted in new duties being placed on the employer in respect of, for 
example, disclosure of information and prevention of harassment.44 Barker 
accepts that the duty applies in the employment context but, in the 
circumstances, it was found to have no application as it was held that there 
was no relevant contractual benefit (such as an entitlement to redeployment) 
with which the implied term could engage.45 It was said that the duty of 
FRRSHUDWLRQµis anchored upon the need for one party to take a positive step 
without which the other party is unable to enjoy a right or benefit conferred 
upon it by the contract¶.¶ I would suggest that a narrower approach to the 
duty of cooperation ± compared to the UK ± is likely to be one of the most 
significant elements of Barker: µwhatever the historical basis in the United 
Kingdom for the implied duty of mutual trust and confidence, it cannot be 
supported in this country as an expression or development of the implied 
duty of cooperation¶.¶46 It is my contention that a number of the outcomes 
achieved by mutual trust are realizable by other common law means but a 
positive version of the duty of co-operation remains important if the 
common law is to insist on µJRRG¶EHKDYLRXUAt the core of Barker may be 
a concern with a potential expansion of the law that a focus on the 
µpsychological conditions which are essential to the performance by an 
HPSOR\HHRIKLVRUKHUSDUWRIWKHEDUJDLQ¶PD\OHDGWRIt is this somewhat 
amorphous dimension of mutual trust that a conservative court may be 
afraid of. 
                                                          
43 Lord Steyn in Malik, n. 8 above, 15 adopting the view of B. A. Hepple, Employment Law 
134-±135 (4th ed., 1981),. 
44 Scally v. Southern Health Board [1992] 1 AC 294; Waters v. Commissioner of Police 
[2000] 4 All ER 934. 
45 Secured Income Real Estate (Australia) Ltd v. St Martins Investments Pty Ltd (1979) 144 
CLR 596. 
46 Barker, n. 9 above. 
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Regulski v. State of Victoria provides a demonstration of the diminished 
extent of common law protection afforded by adopting a narrower 
conception of the obligation of co-operation. In Regulski the applicant 
argued that a breach of that duty arose by virtue of the employer failing to 
comply with their Anti Bullying and Workplace Conflict Policy.47 It was 
ruled that the policy was non-contractual and could not found a claim. 
Mutual trust would have been doubly relevant in a case of this sort. First, it 
might have provided a route to incorporation if publication of the policy 
could have been viewed as giving rise to legitimate expectations on the part 
of the employee.48 Previously, in Thomson v. Orica Australia Pty Ltd, 
Allsop J had regarded mutual trust as the basis for finding that an employer 
had breached the employment contract by refusing to honour its own human 
resources policy: 
 
µIt is unnecessary to decide the question whether the policy was 
contractually binding. There is much to be said for the proposition that it 
ZDV«+RZHYHUZKHWKHURUQRWFRQWUDFWXDOO\ELQGLQJLQWHUPVLt was 
plainly company policy and if the company conducted itself in breach of it 
in a serious way, that would be a matter assisting in the conclusion as to 
whether or not Orica had behaved in a manner in breach of the implied 
term«¶.49 
 
Second, and in any event, mutual trust and confidence of itself may have 
required the same action of the employer. In contrast to Barker mutual trust 
posits the existence of an obligation of co-operation unrelated to any 
specific WHUPRIWKHDSSOLFDQW¶VFRQWUDFW. 
The benefits to employees of a duty of co-operation with a positive 
dimension can be seen in recent Canadian litigation. In Baroch v. Canada 
Cartage the plaintiff alleged that the employer, as a matter of policy, only 
paid overtime if the 60sixty-hour threshold imposed by statute was 
                                                          
47 [2015] FCA 206. 
48 French v. Barclays Bank [1998] IRLR 646. 
49 [2002] FCA 939. 
Formatted: Not Highlight
Formatted: Not Highlight
Formatted: Not Highlight
Formatted: Superscript, Not Highlight
Formatted: Superscript, Not Highlight
Formatted: Superscript, Not Highlight
33 
 
exceeded; that it had no written overtime policy, no directives for its human 
resources staff, and no centralized record-keeping system; that overtime 
eligibility determinations were made on a case-by-case basis in disregard of 
applicable law.50 The plaintiff submitted that in doing so, the employer 
failed to act in good faith and breached a duty of care by failing to take 
reasonable steps (such as having appropriate record-keeping systems in 
place) to ensure that employees were compensated at appropriate rates of 
pay for all hours worked. It was said that good faith ± as with mutual trust 
and confidence ± required the employer to co-operate in a positive manner. 
As a result the following omissions were seen as founding a relevant claim 
that the employer had a policy or practice of avoiding or disregarding its 
overtime obligations: (1) Canada Cartage had no written overtime policy. 
There was no Canada Cartage document that employees could consult to 
learn how their overtime entitlement would be calculated. (2) Canada 
Cartage never issued any written directives to managers, supervisors or the 
payroll department about how to apply the various overtime rules and 
thresholds. There was no Canada Cartage document or directive that persons 
responsible IRUFDOFXODWLQJDQHPSOR\HH¶VRYHUWLPHFRXOGFRQVXOWWRHQVXUH
that they do so in a consistent fashion. 
Similarly in Fulawka v. Bank of Nova Scotia it was found that the duty of 
good faith could include a requirement that the employer take active 
measures to ensure that employees are not required or permitted to work 
overtime in breach of Canadian Labour Code in order to perform the usual 
duties of their employment.51 The employees were seen as particularly 
vulnerable µas they do not have the protection of a union and they are not 
members of management¶.¶ Moreover, the system of work added to this 
concern:  
 
                                                          
50 2015 ONSC 40. 
51 111 OR(3D) 346. 
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µThe nature of their work, which requires that they respond to the 
unpredictable demands of customers, makes the necessity to work overtime 
a real possibility. The understandable need for managers to control overtime 
costs and the pre-approval requirement in the policy create institutional 
impediments to claims for overtime pay.¶ 
 
A more traditional approach would have left it to the claimants to 
establish that the employer was in breach on a case- by- case basis. The 
imposition of general obligations which require the employer to have 
effective systems in place makes it more likely that employees will receive 
the full benefit of the work-wage bargain. Twentieth century authority, such 
as the seminal case of Wilsons & Clyde Coal v. English, imposed a set of 
general rules to ensure that employers had systems in place to ensure the 
physical safety of workers.52 In the twenty-first century the courts are 
beginning to build a similar regime which encompasses WKHHPSOR\HH¶V
financial and psychological interests. 
6 BUSINESS EFFICACY 
The mere denial of mutual trust may be of less significance than might have 
been assumed, but the approach to implication taken by the High Court 
appears to be more ominous. Implied terms allow for an expression of the 
judicial view as to the appropriate obligations in a relationship, and policy 
aims may be furthered in the process. Through this medium the employment 
contract can be developed in a more socially progressive way. Barker 
espouses a clear reluctance to embrace any such opportunity and holds to a 
very traditional approach whereby terms are only to be implied on the basis 
of µEXVLQHVVHIILFDF\¶. In the court below Jessup J had said that there is µa 
real question whether the courts should take it upon themselves, by the 
development of the common law, to engage in law reform for a better social 
                                                          
52 [1938] AC 57. 
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order¶.¶53 The manner in which the business efficacy test is applied varies 
over both time and jurisdictions but, at the moment, some Australian courts 
are applying it very strictly: µthe criterion of necessity is to be applied at a 
meaningful and rigorous level¶.¶54 I have written elsewhere that such a 
rigorous test for implication is favoured as a means of excluding 
consideration of the policy concerns that have informed the development of 
the implied term of mutual trust in other jurisdictions.55 Reliance on 
business efficacy makes it easier to cleave to the position that, at some level 
at least, the contract functions perfectly adequately in the absence of terms 
of this sort. Such an approach is also said to accord with the proper scope of 
judicial law-making which should µonly be exercised as an incident of the 
adjudication of particular disputes¶.¶56 Barker may point to the dawning of a 
period of conservatism where attempts to advance terms such as mutual 
trust and confidence which take a more reciprocal view of the obligations 
pertaining to the employment relationship (and in the process impose 
additional obligations on employers) are likely to be rebuffed. 
Reliance on the business efficacy test is however likely to offer an 
unreliable barrier to judicial creativity should a court be inclined to 
innovate. As Riley has pointed out, the test in practice may well operate 
differently where default rules are in issue.57 Certainly earlier authority had 
been to the effect that µconsiderations of policy can, and do, have a part to 
play in determining whether or not it is necessary that a contractual 
obligation should be implied in law in a given class of contract¶.58 It is not 
                                                          
53 Barker, n. 11 above, para 324. 
54 Caratti Holdings v. Coventry Group [2014] WASC 403l. 
55 D. Brodie, in M. Freedland (ed.), The Contract of Employment, (M. Freedland ed., OUP: 
2016). 
56 Barker, n. 9 above, 19. 
57 In Energy Fundamentals v. Veresen (2015) ONSC 692 it was said that it µ`is worthy of 
QRWHWKDWJRRGIDLWKLQIRUPVZKDWLVQHFHVVDU\¶ 
58 University of Western Australia v. Gray [2009] FCAFC 116. It may be noted that in 
Byrne v. Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 410 the High Court approved the decision 
of the House of Lords in Liverpool CC v. Irwin [1977] AC 239 where the approach was 
clearly policy orientated. 
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beyond the bounds that there will be a reversion to the latter approach. It is 
after all probably impossible to exclude questions of reasonableness from 
decisions on implication. In Energy Fundamentals v. Veresen it was said 
that: 
 
 µit is plainly the case that the implied terms must themselves be reasonable. 
One would not expect a court to imply terms into an agreement that it 
considered to be unreasonable. Further, keeping in mind that the implied in 
fact term rests on the presumed intentions of the parties, courts quite 
understandably presume intentions of the parties that are reasonable« 
although necessity appears to be the threshold that must be met before 
engaging in the exercise of implying the term, the formulation of the term to 
be implied is very much an exercise that rests on a concept of 
reasonableness.¶59 
 
7 THE COUNTERVAILING IMPACT OF GOOD 
FAITH 
Attention has been drawn to the richness of the common law and the fact 
that claimants may be able to look to an alternative ground of claim in 
circumstances which, in other jurisdictions, might be brought as mutual trust 
cases. Success need not be contingent upon the existence of mutual trust and 
confidence. This compels us to take a broad view of relevant doctrine before 
arriving at any assessment of the state of the law. Admittedly, renewed 
allegiance to the business efficacy test, and a traditional approach to the 
operation of the duty of co-operation, suggest that there is a real danger that 
the common law will develop in a manner that would not be in the interests 
of employees. There are however powerful countervailing tendencies. In 
particular it appears that norms of fair dealing and good faith are becoming 
more firmly embedded in contract law as a whole and may diminish the 
                                                          
59 Energy Fundamentals v. Veresen 2015 ONCA 514 citing J.D. McCamus, The Law of 
Contracts, 2nd ed. 781 (2d ed., Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012). 
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impact of Barker. Indeed it is more than arguable that they will prove to be 
more influential. 
In Australia there has been considerable judicial recognition of the 
concept of a relational contract which might be defined as a µcontract that 
involves not merely an exchange, but also a relationship between the 
contracting parties¶.¶60 Nevertheless, it was argued in Barker that the term 
µadvances analysis not at all, not merely only a little way, but not at all. All 
contracts create a relation between the parties to it «¶61 The High Court 
appeared to see some merit in this submission. They noted that the implied 
obligation of mutual trust and confidence µappears, at least in part, to be 
informed by a view of thHHPSOR\PHQWFRQWUDFWDV³UHODWLRQDO´, a 
FKDUDFWHULVWLFRIXQFHUWDLQDSSOLFDWLRQLQWKLVFRQWH[W«¶62 This scepticism 
is a little surprising given that in Australia relational contract scholarship 
has been influential in the way in which the law of commercial contracts has 
developed in recent years. The Australian courts were much quicker to 
move in this direction than their British counterparts. The extent to which 
Barker proves to be a restraining influence will depend in part on the stance 
taken in subsequent cases on relational contracts. The employment contract 
is a paradigm instance of a contract of that nature and categorization as 
relational, in the eyes of some courts, facilitates implication of a term of 
good faith given the values which such contracts are said to espouse.63 
Again it can lead to the sorts of changes associated with a positive version 
of the duty of co-operation. 'XQNLQ¶%UDQGV provides a recent Canadian 
example: 
 
                                                          
60 M.A. Eisenberg, Relational Contracts, in J. Beatson and D. Friedmann (eds.), Good 
Faith and Fault in Contract Law 296 (J. Beatson and D. Friedmann eds., Oxford: OUP, 
1995). 
61 [2014] HCA Trans 73. 
62 Barker, n. 9 above, para. 37. 
63 The Supreme Court took the view that an employment contract is relational in nature in 
Braganza v. BP [2015] ICR 449. 
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 µ,WZDVWKXVDSSURSULDWH«IRUWKHMXGJHWRLQIHUWKDWWKH)UDQFKLVRUKDd 
implicitly agreed to undertake reasonable measures to help the franchisees, 
over the life of the arrangement, to support the brand. This included a duty 
to assist them in staving off competition in order to promote the on-going 
prosperity of the network as an inherent feature of the relational franchise 
contract.¶64 
 
Interwoven to some extent with the acceptance of the concept of 
relational contracts has been the growing recognition in Australia of an 
implied obligation of good faith. A definitive statement of the current 
position is problematic in the absence of an authoritative High Court 
judgment; whether or not there is a general obligation to act in good faith in 
the performance of contracts generally, or employment contracts in 
particular, was again left undecided in Barker. However, as we have seen, 
the existing line of good faith case law allows for many of the developments 
associated with mutual trust and confidence, such as implied restraint on the 
exercise of prerogative powers, to operate. In Braganza Lord Neuberger 
found µit difficult to accept that trust and confidence would require more 
WKDQZKDWLQDQRUPDOFRPPHUFLDOFRQWH[WZRXOGEHH[SHFWHG¶ where 
discretion will be µlimited, as a matter of necessary implication, by concepts 
of honesty, good faith, and genuineness, and the need for the absence of 
arbitrariness, capriciousness, perversity and irrationality¶.¶65 Contract law in 
a number of jurisdictions is moving towards a position whereby good faith 
stands centre stage, and commercial law cases in Australia have been very 
much part of this. This may represent the µQHZFRPPHUFLDOPRUDOLW\¶,Q
Canada the Supreme Court in Bhasin v. Hrynew recognized that good faith 
constituted an overarching principle in the general law of contract, and this 
allows more specific developments within the employment contract to be 
mainstreamed.66 Thus the obligation on the employer in Canada (emerging 
from cases such as Shah v. Xerox Canada) to treat an employee with 
                                                          
64 (2015) QCCA 625. 
65 Braganza, n. 63 above. 
66 Bhasin, n. 21 above. 
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civility, decency, respect and dignity can be seen as an instance of good 
faith and is rendered more secure as a result.67 
Good faith serves as a means of rationalisation rationalization of the 
existing law but also functions as a powerful catalyst: 
 
 µThe application of the organizing principle of good faith to particular 
situations should be developed where the existing law is found to be 
wanting and where the development may occur incrementally in a way that 
is consistent with the structure of the common law of contract and gives due 
weight to the importance of private ordering and certainty in commercial 
affairs.¶68 
 
A law of contract where good faith played a central role would 
undoubtedly prompt further evolution in the law of the employment contract 
and would lead to the sort of specific changes that materialise materialize 
through the adoption of mutual trust. For instance, in the UK, Scally v. 
Southern Health Board modified the law on provision of information and 
Bhasin might be thought to have taken Canadian law closer to a general 
requirement of disclosure but the courts have not yet gone this far.69 The 
Canadian case of Trillium Motor World v. General Motors suggests that 
disclosure would be more likely to be required where a relationship of 
employment or franchise was concerned.70 The scope for a general 
obligation of good faith to enhance the content of the employment contract 
is almost without limit. In the UK mutual trust has become, in practical 
terms, entrenched relatively quickly though given its status as a default rule 
there remains a possibility that the employer may seek to contract-out. By 
way of contrast Canadian experience suggests that the centrality of good 
                                                          
67 Evans v. Avalon (2015) CanLII 41499; Shah v. Xerox Canada Ltd. (2000) CanLII 
2317(ON CA). 
68 Rodd v. Alberta Health Services 2015 ABQB 320. 
69 2176693 v. Cora Franchise (2015) ONSC 1265 noted that µ`parties must not lie or 
otherwise knowingly mislead each other about matters directly linked to the performance of 
the contract. This does not impose a duty of loyalty or of disclosure or require a party to 
forego advantages flowing from the contract; it is a simple requirement not to lie or mislead  
WKHRWKHUSDUW\DERXWRQH¶VFRQWUDFWXDOSHUIRUPDQFH¶  
70 (2015) ONSC 3824. 
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faith leads much more directly and decisively to a prohibition on contracting 
out: µViewed in this way, the entire agreement clause in « the Agreement is 
not an impediment to the duty arising in this case. Because the duty of 
honesty in contractual performance is a general doctrine of contract law that 
applies to all contracts, like unconscionability, the parties are not free to 
exclude it « ¶.71 It would appear that a Canadian court would prohibit 
exclusion on the basis of public policy.72 It should be noted that 
unconscionability is unlikely to provide an alternative route and is viewed as 
restrictively in Canada as elsewhere.73 
Good faith has the capacity to tackle other fundamental issues including 
ones going to the duration of the relationship. Data & Scientific v. Oracle 
flags up the possibility that the scope of fair dealing might extend to 
UHJXODWHWKHHPSOR\HU¶VGLVFUHWLRQZKHUHUenewal of a contract was in 
issue.74 This is an area of employment relations where employees can be 
very vulnerable and there is considerable scope for abuse. Employees might 
be placed on a succession of contracts to prevent the acquiring of statutory 
rights to give but one example. Evans v. Avalon cogently demonstrates the 
impact that good faith can have on doctrine where resignation is concerned. 
In a situation where it is ambiguous whether the employee has resigned, the 
                                                          
71 Bhasin, n. 21 above, 75. 
72 The general approach is to be found in Tercon Contractors Ltd. v. British Columbia 
(Transportation and Highways) >@6&5µ7KHIROORZLQJDQDOysis should be 
applied when a plaintiff seeks to escape the effect of an exclusion clause or other 
FRQWUDFWXDOWHUPVWRZKLFKLWKDGSUHYLRXVO\DJUHHG«WKHVHFRQGLVVXHLVZKHWKHUWKH
exclusion clause was unconscionable and thus invalid at the time the contract was made. If 
the exclusion clause is held to be valid at the time of contract formation and applicable to 
the facts of the case, a third enquiry may be raised as to whether the court should 
nevertheless refuse to enforce the exclusion clause because RIDQRYHUULGLQJSXEOLFSROLF\¶ 
73 Cain v. Clarica Life Insurance Company 2005 ABCA 437 provides that the four 
elements which are necessary for a finding of unconscionability are as follows: (1) a 
JURVVO\XQIDLUDQGLPSURYLGHQWWUDQVDFWLRQYLFWLP¶VOack of independent legal advice or 
RWKHUVXLWDEOHDGYLFHRYHUZKHOPLQJLPEDODQFHLQEDUJDLQLQJSRZHUFDXVHGE\YLFWLP¶V
ignorance of business, illiteracy, ignorance of the language of the bargain, blindness, 
deafness, illness, senility, or similar disaELOLW\DQGRWKHUSDUW\¶VNQRZLQJO\WDNLQJ
advantage of this vulnerability. 
74 (2015) ONSC 4178. And see Transco v. 2¶%ULHQ [2002] ICR 721. 
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courts will resolve those doubts in favour of continued employment.75 
However, the obligation of fair dealing goes further and suggests that in 
some circumstances an employer may be obliged to allow an employee the 
opportunity to withdraw what was undoubtedly intended and understood as 
a resignation.76 This perspective acknowledges the impact that loss of 
employment may have on the employee and that, on occasion, a resignation 
may be proffered in the heat of the moment: 
 
 µwhere, for an example, an employee who the employer knows to be 
emotionally distraught and financially vulnerable has made a statement of 
resignation, it would be unreasonable for the employer, objectively and 
reasonably considering all the circumstances, to disregard both the 
emotional distress and the financial vulnerability of that employee.¶77 
 
Fair dealing requires the party with superior bargaining power and 
resources to make allowance for this in the interests of preserving the 
relationship. 
8 A HOLISTIC VIEW OF THE COMMON LAW 
Employees are likely to be among the beneficiaries of the increased role for 
good faith/fair dealing which is occurring across a range of contracts and 
jurisdictions. Common law reform of this nature may more than outweigh 
the denial of mutual trust and confidence. It is also important to have regard 
to protections afforded by the Australian courts which other systems may 
lack. The common law provides a code which dictates how the parties ought 
to behave towards one another: the laws of contract and tort both play a part. 
The way in which the employeU¶VREOLJDWLRQVDUHVSOLWEHWZHHQWKose two 
branches of the law of obligations varies between jurisdictions. There are, 
for instance, significant differences in the stance taken by the courts in UK 
and Australia and this extends to the nature of the obligations undertaken. 
                                                          
75 Bru v. AGM Enterprises 2008 BCSC 1680. 
76 Evans, n. 67 above. 
77 Bru, n. 75 above. 
Formatted: Not Highlight
Formatted: Not Highlight
Formatted: Not Highlight
Formatted: Superscript, Not Highlight
Formatted: Superscript, Not Highlight
Formatted: Font: Not Italic
Formatted: Int cross ref
Formatted: Superscript, Not Highlight
Formatted: Font: Not Italic
Formatted: Int cross ref
33 
 
Where the former is concerned the existence of mutual trust and confidence 
might be said to point towards greater commitment to contemporary values. 
The dicta of Jessup J referred to earlier would now be unthinkable in a 
British context. However, in the UK a restricted view is taken over the 
HPSOR\HU¶VUHVSRQVLELOLWies should an employee suffer psychiatric harm in 
the course of his employment.78 By way of contrast, the Australian law of 
negligence tends to operate in an unadulterated way, thereby both 
facilitating recovery and promoting in a different way progressive values. 
For instance, the restrictions imposed by the House of Lords in White v. 
Chief Constable have not been adopted.79 
In the UK where occupational stress is concerned the judiciary (in Hatton 
v. Somerset CC) have provided a set of guidelines (styled µpractical 
propositions¶ZKLFKDVVLVWWKHFRXUWLQGHWHUPLQLQJZKHWKHUDEUHDFKRIthe 
HPSOR\HU¶Vduty of reasonable care has taken place and, in practice, make it 
more difficult for employees to recover.80 The guidelines emerged as an 
embodiment of common law policy on employer responsibility for 
occupational stress. The value judgment is maGHWKDWµVRPHWKLQJVDUHQR
RQH¶VIDXOW¶7KHMXGLFLDU\VWULYHWRDFKLHYHDQDFFHSWDEOHEDOance between 
safeguarding the wellbeing of employees and not burdening employers with 
some of the risks which are inherent in working life. It regarded as fair that 
some such risks are borne by employees since: 
 
 µThere is no such thing as a pressure-free job. Every job brings its own set 
of tasks, responsibilities and day-to-day problems, and the pressures and 
demands these place on us are an unavoidable part of working life. We are, 
after all, paid to work and to work hard, and to accept the reasonable 
pressures which go with that.¶81 
 
                                                          
78 Yapp, n. 25 above. 
79 [1999] 2 AC 455. It was held that the law does not recognize a duty to guard employees 
against psychiatric harm suffered as a result of witnessing injury to others.  
80 Hatton v. Sutherland [2002] ICR 613. 
81 Ibid. at. 
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Recently, in Yapp v. FCO the claimant developed a psychiatric condition 
following a defective process of suspension and the application of the 
guidelines was extended to cover a situation of that sort.82 This is very much 
open to challenge as the µSUDFWLFDOSURSRVLWLRQV¶GRQRWDGGUHVVVLWXDWLRQV
where the employer can be said to be at fault or guilty of inappropriate 
behaviour. It seems likely that Hatton would also be found to apply in 
bullying or harassment cases. Furthermore, in Yapp, when it came to the 
question of remoteness, the standard tests in contract and tort were said to 
apply but there was a reticence to let fundamental principles apply in the 
courts below without direction: µit will in my view be exceptional that an 
apparently robust employee, with no history of any psychiatric ill-health, 
will develop a depressive illness as a result even of a very serious setback at 
work¶.¶ The claim in Yapp itself failed because it was held not to be 
foreseeable, in the absence of any sign of special vulnerability, that the 
claimant might develop a psychiatric illness. It seems likely that future 
claimants will find litigation just as arduous. 
In Australia a different view is taken over risk allocation and it is 
recognized that the employer has a duty to take reasonable care to protect an 
employee against bullying and harassment at work and to provide a safe 
workplace. The position is the same where claims are based on stress arising 
from an excessive or unreasonable workload. These are mainstream 
obligations imposed by the law of tort and merely subject to the limitation 
that the harm suffered must be psychiatric before recovery will take place. 
The courts have not imposed policy informed restrictions of the sort seen in 
Hatton or Yapp which are highly favourable to the employer, though 
demonstrating that the harm should have been foreseen can be challenging 
for claimants. In evaluating the law in Australia it should be borne in mind 
that tort law appears to be much more protectivHRIDQHPSOR\HH¶VLQWHUHVWV
                                                          
82 Yapp, n. 25 above. 
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than the UK. Matters are though never entirely clear as Koehler v. Cerebos 
demonstrates.83 There the High Court held that by entering into the 
employment contract the employee warrants (in the same way that they 
warrant that they possess the requisite skills) that they are mentally fit for 
the job. Koehler operates on the premise that the employee accepts that he 
cannot complain should he be adversely affected by the normal pressures 
and stresses of the employment chosen. It appears that the employer is 
benefiting from a defence along the lines of volenti non fit injuria. 
Subsequent cases suggest that Koehler does not allow the employer to deny 
responsibility where harm was reasonably foreseeable and appropriate 
action was not taken and, viewed in the round, the position is clearly more 
progressive than that pertaining in the UK.84 Koehler also reminds us that 
the interaction of the laws of contract and negligence is far from 
straightforward. 
9 COHERENCE WITH STATUTE 
Statute may act as a catalyst or constraint for common law expansion but 
perhaps presents the biggest challenge to the vitality of the common law in 
any jurisdiction. 85 Analysis of the relationship between common law and 
statute is rendered more difficult as µno satisfying overarching principle has 
been identified to explain the relationship between statute and common 
law¶.¶86 A recent instance of statute acting as a catalyst is provided by 
Romero where the employer argued that the existence of legislation dealing 
with bullying militated against incorporation of a policy on µWorkplace 
+DUDVVPHQWDQG'LVFULPLQDWLRQ¶ as employees were already adequately 
protected.87 However, the legislation was seen as embodying the values of 
                                                          
83 Koehler v. Cerebos (2005) 222 CLR 44. 
84 C. Sappideen et al., 0DFNHQ¶V/DZRI(PSOR\PHQW, 190 (7th ed.). 
85 See G. Golding this issue. 
86 S. McLeish, Challenges to the Survival of the Common Law [2014] MULR 818. 
87 Romero v. Farstad n. 39, above. 
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the employment relationship and incorporation was favoured: the parties 
should be encouraged to adopt µa specific method as to the manner in which 
those statutory obligations are to be observed¶. This approach is consistent 
with that taken to the action on the statute where industrial health and safety 
legislation is concerned. The courts have never regarded judicial 
intervention to install a right to damages as inappropriate and the 
HPSOR\HH¶VDFWLRQIRUEUHDFKRIVWDWXWRU\GXW\WKULYHVGHVSLWHWKHIDFWWKDW
VWDWXWHZLOODOUHDG\KDYHSURYLGHGDUHPHG\µthe specific duties imposed on 
employers in relation to factory premises are enforceable by an action for 
damages, notwithstanding the imposition by the statutes of criminal 
penalties for any breach¶.¶88 The position has changed in the UK of late 
where section 69 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 has 
removed the right to sue for damages where an employee is injured at work 
if a breach of health and safety regulations was a cause of their injury. It is 
notable that the justification for removal of the action on the statute does not 
lie in the constitutional proprieties of judicial strengthening of the legislative 
scheme but instead goes to the perceived burden of EU legislation. 
The traditional approach to actions on the statute is symptomatic of a 
tendency to regard legislative intervention as only partially pre-empting the 
scope for common law development. Where health and safety is concerned, 
the courts can be seen as furthering legislative policy by creating a remedy 
which will render the legislation more effective. A similar approach to 
common law evolution can also be seen in a number of decisions in the US 
which have been arrived at by gauging the merits of a claim for judicial 
innovation against the demands of public policy as expressed in the relevant 
statute. Thus common law remedies have been devised to supplement those 
contained in discrimination legislation: further exceptions to the 
                                                          
88 X v. Bedfordshire [1995] 2 AC 633, 731. 
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employment-at-ZLOOGRFWULQHDUHMXVWLILHGDVGLVFULPLQDWLRQLVµREQR[LRXVWR
the interests of the state and contrary to public policy and sound 
It is not disputed that common law evolution must have regard to the 
constitutional dimension: 
 
 µthe objection is made that the analogical use of statute violates the doctrine 
of Parliamentary sovereignty to the extent that it involves the operation in 
some way of a statutory regime or a regime modelled on a statutory regime 
QRWZLWKVWDQGLQJ3DUOLDPHQW¶s legislative decision that the text of the statute 
was to be limited, for example to a particular context or to a particular 
period of time.¶90 
 
 It is undoubtedly clear that the nature of a particular legislative measure 
may preclude further common law activity. Glanville Williams in a seminal 
article noted that µOccasionally the statute may be plainly inconsistent with 
a remedy in tort. For example, here the statute gives a civil remedy which is 
hedged about by restrictions, it would not be permissible to ignore the 
restrictions by implying an unrestricted right of DFWLRQLQWRUW¶91 It may be 
argued that decisions such as Johnson v. Unisys and NSW v. Paige can be 
H[SODLQHGRQWKLVEDVLVWKRXJKWKHYLHZWKDWWKHFODLPDQWV¶SRVLWLRQZDV
µSODLQO\LQFRQVLVWHQW¶LVKHDYLO\FRQWHVWHGHowever, it is easy to overstate 
the constitutional difficulties and µKREEOH¶Whe common law. In British 
Railways Board v. Herrington, Lord Wilberforce, with reference to the 
2FFXSLHUV¶ Liability legislation, put forward a much more nuanced position 
which displays appropriate deference to the legislature but allows for 
common law development: 
 
 ³[I] can see no sense in supposing that when Parliament left the law alone 
as regards trespassers the intention was to freeze the law as, or as it was 
                                                          
89 City of Moorpark v. Superior Court 959 P.2d 752. 
90 J. Beatson, The Role of Statute in the Development of Common Law Doctrine, 117 LQR 
247, 249 (2001). 
91 G. Williams, The Effect of Penal Legislation in the Law of Tort, 23 MLR 233, 24 (1960) 
4. Chadwick v. Pioneer Private Telephone [1941] 1 All ER 522 was said to provide an 
example. 
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taken to be, in 1929. As this Act itself shows, what Parliament left alone in 
the case of trespassers, while displacing them in the cases of invitees or 
licensees, were the rules of common law. But the common law is a 
developing entity as the judges develop it, and so long as we follow the well 
tried method of moving forward in accordance with principle as fresh facts 
emerge and changes in society occur, we are surely doing what Parliament 
intends we should do´.92 
 
 It is also inconsistent ZLWKWKHµcourts fulfilling their time-honoured role 
of updating the common law and making it more suitable for modern 
circumstances¶.¶93 
Where the employment contract is concerned, the Australian courts 
appear wary of proceeding on the basis of partial pre-emption and this is 
likely to constitute a bigger threat to the µQDWXUDO¶HYROXWLRQRIWKHFRPPRQ
law than Barker. Prior to Barker the courts in the UK and Australia had 
excluded mutual trust and confidence when dismissal was in issue.94 
However, the Australian courts appear unduly anxious to defer to the 
legislature and the sheer extent of legislative intervention may be invoked to 
bar the common law from regulating a dimension of employment relations: 
 
 µThe common law in Australia must evolve within the limits of judicial 
power and not trespass into the province of legislative action. This Court 
and, to a lesser extent, intermediate appeal courts have a law-making 
function. That function can only be exercised as an incident of the 
adjudication of particular disputes.¶95 
 
 McDonald v. South Australia provides a good example where the 
Supreme Court of South Australia held that WKHUHVSRQGHQW¶VFRQWUDFWRI
employment did not contain an implied term of mutual trust and 
confidence.96 Statutory regulation of employment in the field of education 
                                                          
92 [1972] AC 877 and quoted by C. Barnard and L. Merrit, Winners and Losers: Edwards 
and the Unfair Law of Dismissal, CLJ 319 (2013). 
93 New Testament Church v. Stewart [2008] ICR 282, 301. 
94 Johnson v. Unisys, n. 10 above and NSW v. Paige [2002] NSWCA 235. 
95 Barker, n. 9 above. 
96 [2009] SASC 219. See R. White, A Setback for Mutual Trust and Confidence 23 AJLL 
220 (2010). More recently, in State of New South Wales v. Shaw, n. 9 above it was said 
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PHDQWWKDWLPSOLFDWLRQZDVQRWQHFHVVDU\µVWDWXWH «SURYLGHVDYDULHW\RI
means by which employees may be protected from abuses of power by the 
employer, and provides means of redress to employees who are aggrieved 
by some conduct of the employer¶.¶ The court in McDonald took the view 
that the protection of the common law would have been superfluous. It must 
be said that the degree of reticence evident in MacDonald is not always 
apparent in other areas of the common law. It may be that the tendentious 
nature of employment relations acts as a deterrent to judicial creativity. It 
should be borne in mind that, in a relationship where bargaining power is 
W\SLFDOO\XQHTXDOIDLOXUHWRLQWHUYHQHZLOOSOD\LQWRWKHHPSOR\HU¶VKDQGV 
A further consideration which may be relevant is the extent to which a 
mooted development can be seen as specific to the employment contract: 
mutual trust and confidence can be viewed in this way. This may render it 
more vulnerable to the argument that it is inconsistent with a particular 
statutory regime. However, where the claimant asserts that a more wide-
ranging development (e.g., that contract law as a whole contains an 
obligation of good faith) is merited, the nature of the argument changes. It is 
then much more difficult to claim that the common law is seeking to subvert 
the will of the legislature in the absence of a nexus with a specific statutory 
provision. 
10 CONCLUSIONS: RESTORING TRADITIONAL 
VALUES? 
By way of conclusion I would suggest that Barker tells us relatively little 
about how the employment contract might evolve. It may be that the open-
textured nature of the µmutual trust¶ term and the consequential capacity for 
wide-UDQJLQJMXGLFLDOH[SDQVLRQRIWKHHPSOR\HU¶VREOLJDWLRQVZHUHVLJQDV
                                                                                                                                                   
obiter that it was not necessary that a term of good faith be implied in order to give the 
UHVSRQGHQWV¶SUREDWLRQDU\FRQWUDFWVHIIHFWLYHRSHUDWLRQLQFLUFXPVWDQFHVZKHUHDVWDWXWRU\
and industrial regime regulated their employment contracts. 
33 
 
LQFRPSDWLEOHZLWKWKHFRPPRQODZ¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRLQFUHPHQWDOFKDQJH
As a result the High Court were of the view that a µWUDQVIRUPDWLYHDSSURDFK¶
to the contract of employment should not be embraced.97 A different stance 
might have been taken had the term mooted possessed greater specificity. 
What might the future hold? I would contend that the two key factors which 
will inform common law development are, on the one hand, the set of values 
which the judiciary consider relevant to the relationship and, on the other, 
the extent to which statute acts as a catalyst or constraint. Where values are 
concerned the position will become more apparent over time but there is 
already some evidence from the case law that a more progressive attitude to 
employment relations continues to be displayed by the Australian common 
law. Incremental advances based upon a contemporary view of the 
employment relationship are likely to continue. Barker may deter more 
radical steps which are seen as within the gift of the legislature. 
Romero, decided after Barker, provides a note of optimism.98 One of the 
issues which arose in Romero was whether thHHPSOR\HU¶VSROLF\ZDV
contractual and two dimensions of the decision call for comment. First, it 
concerned bullying and harassment where the expectations placed on the 
employer have become weightier in recent years. The court in Romero 
recognized this and translated them into legal obligations. Second, where 
WKHOHJDOVWDWXVRIWKHHPSOR\HU¶VSolicies is concerned, the courts now tend 
WRVXEMHFWWKHHPSOR\HU¶VGUDIWLQJWRFORVHVFUXWLQ\WRHQVXUHWKDWGHYLFHV
such as the use of aspirational language do not render the document non-
contractual: key responsibilities should not be discretionary. In the court 
below, contractual status had been denied on the basis that the language was 
overly aspirational: µthere was some quasi contractual language in the 
PolicyLQKLV+RQRXU¶VRSLQLRQLWZDVLQVXIILFLHQWO\VSHFLILFVRDVWR
amount to a binding contractual obligation¶.¶ The Federal Court (Full Court) 
                                                          
97 Barker, n. 9 above, para. 41. 
98 Romero, n. 39 above. 
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took a different view, though a more traditional approach would have 
arrived at a conclusion to the contrary. Aspirational wording should not 
prevent obligations arising in law because: 
 
 µIn the case of the policy here in question, it is evident that the contract 
could not operate reasonably and effectively without such an implied 
obligation. It would make nonsense of the HPSOR\HH¶s ongoing obligation to 
act in accordance with what the policy required of him or her from time to 
time, if the employer had no obligation to act in accordance with what the 
policy required of it.¶ 
 
The employer also argued that the policy was merely µGLUHFWLYH¶DQGZDV
VLPSO\DQH[HUFLVHRIWKHHPSOR\HU¶VULJKWWRLVVXHODZIXODQGUHDVRQDEOH
orders.99 This second line of argument was also rejected: µThe wording of 
the letter of offer taken with the importance of the Policy terms, the 
education of employees to reinforce the terms of the Policy are all factors 
OHDGLQJWRWKDWFRQFOXVLRQ¶7KHHPSOR\HU¶VVWDQFHZRXOGKDYHDOORZHGIRU
unilateral variation and contemporary courts are troubled by an unbridled 
power of this nature. Notions of reciprocity were also relevant: µthe 
HPSOR\HU¶Vobligations in relation to dealing with serious complaints of sex 
discrimination and bullying were contractual promises given in exchange 
for employees being obliged to comply with the behavioural requirements 
imposed on employees by the Policy.¶ This conclusion should be seen not as 
an application of the law of consideration, but a statement of what decent 
employment now involves. 
It is one thing to be confident about the continued impact of progressive 
values but the influence of statute is quite another matter given that, as we 
have seen, the Australian courts adopt a very deferential role in the face of 
legislative intervention. When these two factors are viewed in the round we 
may be left with a position whereby doctrinal innovations that are 
                                                          
99 7KHHPSOR\HU¶VDUJXPHQWLVUHPLQLVFHQWRIWKHDSSURDFKWRWKHFRQWUDFWXDOVWDWXVRIWKH
rule-book taken by the Court of Appeal in Secretary of State for Employment v. Aslef (No2) 
[1972] 2 QB 455. 
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favourable to employees continue to emerge but are limited in number. 
Effective promotion of contemporary values requires the judiciary to be 
bold and take a more expansive view of what they can legitimately achieve. 
